In case of a major cyber incident, organizations usually rely on external providers of Cyber Incident Response (CIR) services. CIR consultants operate in a dynamic and constantly changing environment in which they must actively engage in information management and problem solving while adapting to complex circumstances. In this challenging environment CIR consultants need to make critical decisions about what to advise clients that are impacted by a major cyber incident. Despite its relevance, CIR decision making is an understudied topic. The objective of this preliminary investigation is therefore to understand what decision-making strategies experienced CIR consultants use during challenging incidents and to offer suggestions for training and decision-aiding. A general understanding of operational decision making under pressure, uncertainty, and high stakes was established by reviewing the body of knowledge known as Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). The general conclusion of NDM research is that experts usually make adequate decisions based on (fast) recognition of the situation and applying the most obvious (default) response pattern that has worked in similar situations in the past. In exceptional situations, however, this way of recognition-primed decision-making results in suboptimal decisions as experts are likely to miss conflicting cues once the situation is quickly recognized under pressure. Understanding the default response pattern and the rare occasions in which this response pattern could be ineffective is therefore key for improving and aiding cyber incident response decision making. Therefore, we interviewed six experienced CIR consultants and used the critical decision method (CDM) to learn how they made decisions under challenging conditions. The main conclusion is that the default response pattern for CIR consultants during cyber breaches is to reduce uncertainty as much as possible by gathering and investigating data and thus delay decision making about eradication until the investigation is completed. According to the respondents, this strategy usually works well and provides the most assurance that the threat actor can be completely removed from the network. However, the majority of respondents could recall at least one case in which this strategy (in hindsight) resulted in unnecessary theft of data or damage. Interestingly, this finding is strikingly different from other operational decision-making domains such as the military, police and fire service in which there is a general tendency to act rapidly instead of searching for more information. The main advice is that training and decision aiding of (novice) cyber incident responders should be aimed at the following: (a) make cyber incident responders aware of how recognition-primed decision making works; (b) discuss the default response strategy that typically works well in several scenarios; (c) explain the exception and how the exception can be recognized; (d) provide alternative response strategies that work better in exceptional situations.
This paper conducted a preliminary study of reviewing and exploring bias strategies using a framework of a different discipline: change management. The hypothesis here is: If the major problem of implicit bias strategies is that they do not translate into actual changes in behaviors, then it could be helpful to learn from studies that have contributed to successful change interventions such as reward management, social neuroscience, health behavioral change, and cognitive behavioral therapy. The result of this integrated approach is: (1) current bias strategies can be improved and new ones can be developed with insight from adjunct study fields in change management; (2) it could be more sustainable to invest in a holistic and proactive bias strategy approach that targets the social environment, eliminating the very condition under which biases arise; and (3) while implicit biases are automatic, future studies should invest more on strategies that empower people as “change agents” who can act proactively to regulate the very environment that gives rise to their biased thoughts and behaviors.
It is crucial that ASR systems can handle the wide range of variations in speech of speakers from different demographic groups, with different speaking styles, and of speakers with (dis)abilities. A potential quality-of-service harm arises when ASR systems do not perform equally well for everyone. ASR systems may exhibit bias against certain types of speech, such as non-native accents, different age groups and gender. In this study, we evaluate two widely-used neural network-based architectures: Wav2vec2 and Whisper on potential biases for Dutch speakers. We used the Dutch speech corpus JASMIN as a test set containing read and conversational speech in a human-machine interaction setting. The results reveal a significant bias against non-natives, children and elderly and some regional dialects. The ASR systems generally perform slightly better for women than for men.
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