Op 1 januari 2013 wordt de Wet Bestuur en Toezicht naar verwachting van kracht1. Na invoering van deze wet kunnen bedrijven gemakkelijker kiezen uit de one-tier board en de two-tier board als bestuursmodel. Shell heeft in 2005 het one-tier model ingevoerd en kan dus al de eerste balans opmaken. Ervaringen bij Shell en lessen voor bedrijven die volgen.
Anno 2012 voelt de RvC2 de invloed van internationalisering, meer wet- en regelgeving, de recessie, verscherpt extern toezicht en kritiek van onder meer media en stakeholders, aangemoedigd door de steeds vaker openlijk besproken schandalen (Peij, Bezemer, & Maassen, 2012). Daarnaast dient zich nadrukkelijk het one-tier board model als alternatief voor het in Nederland bekende two-tier model aan (Peij, 2010, p. 38). Deze ontwikkelingen maken de rol van de commissaris meer complex en uitdagend. Hoe kan de RvC in deze omstandigheden voldoende effectief worden of blijven? In de visie van de onderzoekers door inzicht te krijgen in de problemen die de RvC ervaart en in de oorzaken en mogelijke oplossingen die daarbij horen.
Purpose – This study seeks to explore how non-executive directors address governance problems on Dutch two-tier boards. Within this board model, challenges might be particularly difficult to address due to the formal separation of management boards' decision-management from supervisory boards' decision-control roles. Design/methodology/approach – Semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire among non-executive directors provide unique insights into three major challenges in the boardrooms of two-tier boards in The Netherlands. Findings – The study indicates that non-executive directors mainly experience challenges in three areas: the ability to ask management critical questions, information asymmetries between the management and supervisory boards and the management of the relationship between individual executive and non-executive directors. The qualitative in-depth analysis reveals the complexity of the contributing factors to problems in the boardroom and the range of process and social interventions non-executive directors use to address boardroom issues with management and the organization of the board. Practical implications – While policy makers have been largely occupied with the “right” board composition, the results highlight the importance of adequately addressing operational challenges in the boardroom. The results emphasize the importance of a better understanding of board processes and the need of non-executive directors to carefully manage relationships in and around the boardroom. Originality/value – Whereas most studies have focussed on regulatory initiatives to improve the functioning of boards (e.g. the independence of the board), this study explores how non-executive directors attempt to enhance the effectiveness of boards on which they serve.
