ABSTRACT This study investigates how perceptions of radicalisation and co-occurring mental health issues differ between mental health care and the security domain, and how these perceptions affect intersectoral collaboration. It is generally thought that intersectoral collaboration is a useful strategy for preventing radicalisation and terrorism, especially when it concerns radicalised persons with mental health issues. It is not clear, however, what perceptions professionals have of radicalisation and collaboration with other disciplines. Data was obtained from focus groups and individual interviews with practitioners and trainers from mental health care and the security domain in the Netherlands. The results show a lack of knowledge about radicalisation in mental health care, whereas in the security domain, there is little understanding of mental health issues. This leads to a mad-bad dichotomy which has a negative effect on collaboration and risk management. Improvement of the intersectoral collaboration by cross-domain familiarization, and strengthening of trust and mutual understanding, should begin with the basic training of professionals in both domains. The Care and Safety Houses in the Netherlands offer a sound base for intersectoral collaboration. Future professionals from different domains ought to be familiarized with each other’s possibilities, limitations, tasks, and roles.
Full text via link. Human rights safeguard that individuals can develop their ideas and identity undisturbed by government or governmental agencies. With regard to radicalisation, adopting radical ideas is not a crime. Some crimes, such as hate-speech and ideological violence, are associated with radicalisation, but when individuals or groups only develop ideas without committing crimes there is no legal ground or justification for intervening.
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Over the past decades, many targeted policy strategies for countering violent extremism (CVE) have shown all kinds of weaknesses and side effects, especially for already marginalised citizens. Awareness of these serious downsides led to a whole branch of more generic social strategies aimed at prevention of violent extremism (PVE). Yet, tackling or preventing radicalisation in education (PVE-E) is one of the most notable and promising fruits of this branch. However, even 20 years after the 9/11 attacks, research in this field is still scarce, available findings are limited, and assumptions are fraught with many complexities. This chapter offers an overview of current formal and non-formal educational practices for tackling radicalisation, and argues schools can only contribute to this agenda if it is organised through a pedagogical lens, and in the end suggests a reset to help make PVE-E more educative than the current goals of PVE suggest.
