The journal was a forum for the work of both theorists and practitioners of philosophical practice with children, and published such work in all forms, including philosophical argument and reflection, classroom transcripts, curricula, empirical research, and reports from the field. The journal also maintained a tradition in publishing articles in the hermeneutics of childhood, a field of intersecting disciplines including cultural studies, social history, philosophy, art, literature and psychoanalysis.
Recently several attempts were undertaken to unite the field of metaphor studies, trying to reconcile the conceptual/cognition and linguistic/discourse approaches to metaphor (Hampe, 2017b). The dynamic view of metaphor espoused by amongst others Gibbs (2017a) as a way to unify the field of metaphor studies is said to converge on findings and theoretical predictions found in cognition and discourse approaches. The author argues this focus on dynamical models to explain the multi-scale socio-cognitive aspects of metaphor as an emergent phenomenon is not robust enough. Complexity and dynamical systems are merely a modelling technique to deploy theory for empirical testing of hypotheses; a dynamic view of metaphor needs a coherent background theory to base its dynamic modelling of metaphor in action on (Chemero, 2009). I argue that it can be successfully based on the ecological-enactive framework available within the modern paradigm of 4E cognitive science. This framework makes possible explanation of both 'lower' cognition and 'higher' cognition emerging in the interaction of an organism with its environment. In addition, I sketch how recent theoretical insights from ecological-enactivism (Baggs and Chemero, 2018) concerning Gibson's notion of environment apply to the attempted unification of the field of metaphor studies. I close by suggesting how an understanding of metaphor as an ecological affordance of the socio-cultural environment can provide a rich basis for empirical hypotheses within a dynamical science of metaphor.
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From the article: Abstract Over the last decades, philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that the brain constitutes only one of several contributing factors to cognition, the other factors being the body and the world. This position we refer to as Embodied Embedded Cognition (EEC). The main purpose of this paper is to consider what EEC implies for the task interpretation of the control system. We argue that the traditional view of the control system as involved in planning and decision making based on beliefs about the world runs into the problem of computational intractability. EEC views the control system as relying heavily on the naturally evolved fit between organism and environment. A ‘lazy’ control structure could be ‘ignorantly successful’ in a ‘user friendly’ world, by facilitating the transitory creation of a flexible and integrated set of behavioral layers that are constitutive of ongoing behavior. We close by discussing the types of questions this could imply for empirical research in cognitive neuroscience and robotics.
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