In general, people are poorly protected against cyberthreats, with the main reason being user behaviour. For the study described in this paper, a ques-tionnaire was developed in order to understand how people’s knowledge of and attitude towards both cyberthreats and cyber security controls affect in-tention to adopt cybersecure behaviour. The study divides attitude into a cog-nitive and an affective component. Although only the cognitive component of attitude is usually studied, the results from a questionnaire of 300 respond-ents show that both the affective and cognitive components of attitude have a clearly positive, albeit varying, influence on behavioural intention, with the affective component having an even greater effect on attitude than the cog-nitive aspect. No correlation was found between knowledge and behavioural intention. The results indicate that attitude is an important factor to include when developing behavioural interventions, but also that different kinds of attitude should be addressed differently in interventions.
Adversarial thinking is essential when dealing with cyber incidents and for finding security vulnerabilities. Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions are used all around the world to stimulate adversarial thinking. Jeopardy-style CTFs, given their challenge-and-answer based nature, are used more and more in cybersecurity education as a fun and engaging way to inspire students. Just like traditional written exams, Jeopardy-style CTFs can be used as summative assessment. Did a student provide the correct answer, yes or no. Did the participant in the CTF competition solve the challenge, yes or no. This research project provides a framework for measuring the learning outcomes of a Jeopardy-style CTF and applies this framework to two CTF events as case studies. During these case studies, participants were tested on their knowledge and skills in the field of cybersecurity and queried on their attitude towards CTF education. Results show that the main difference between traditional written exam and a Jeopardy-style CTF is the way in which questions a re formulated. CTF education is stated to be challenging and fun because questions are formulated as puzzles that need to be solved in a gamified and competitive environment. Just like traditional written exams, no additional insight into why the participant thinks the correct answer is the correct answer has been observed or if the participant really did learn anything new by participating. Given that the main difference between a traditional written exam and a Jeopardy-style CTF is the way in which questions are formulated, learning outcomes can be measured in the same way. We can ask ourselves how many participants solved which challenge and to which measurable statements about “knowledge, skill and attitude” in the field of cybersecurity each challenge is related. However, when mapping the descriptions of the quiz-questions and challenges from the two CTF events as case studies to the NICE framework on Knowledge, Skills and Abilities in cybersecurity, the NICE framework did not provide us with detailed measurable statements that could be used in education. Where the descriptions of the quiz-questions and challenges were specific, the learning outcomes of the NICE framework are only formulated in a quite general matter. Finally, some evidence for Csíkszentmihályi’s theory of Flow has been observed. Following the theory of Flow, a person can become fully immersed in performing a task, also known as “being in the zone” if the “challenge level” of the task is in line with the person’s “skill level”. The persons mental state towards a task will be different depending on the challenge level of the task and required skill level for completing it. Results show that participants state that some challenges were difficult and fun, where other challenges were easy and boring. As a result of this9 project, a guide / checklist is provided for those intending to use CTF in education.
The growing sophistication, frequency and severity of cyberattacks targeting all sectors highlight their inevitability and the impossibility of completely protecting the integrity of critical computer systems. In this context, cyber-resilience offers an attractive alternative to the existing cybersecurity paradigm. We define cyber-resilience as the capacity to withstand, recover from and adapt to the external shocks caused by cyber-risks. This article seeks to provide a broader organizational understanding of cyber-resilience and the tensions associated with its implementation. We apply Weick's (1995) sensemaking framework to examine four foundational tensions of cyber-resilience: a definitional tension, an environmental tension, an internal tension, and a regulatory tension. We then document how these tensions are embedded in cyber-resilience practices at the preparatory, response and adaptive stages. We rely on qualitative data from a sample of 58 cybersecurity professionals to uncover these tensions and how they reverberate across cyber-resilience practices.
