Zoekresultaten

All-inclusive sustainability? The sustainable development goals at the Antwerp Port Authority

How completely and similarly do safety authorities address hazards posed by new technology?

The continuous increase of accident and incident reports has indicated the potential of drones to threaten public safety. The published regulatory framework for small drones is not visibly based on a comprehensive hazard analysis. Also, a variety in the constraints imposed by different regulatory frameworks across the globe might impede market growth and render small-drone operations even more complicated since light drones might be easily transferred and operated in various regions with diverse restrictions. In our study we applied the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) method to small-drone operations and we generated a first set of Safety Requirements (SR) for the authority, manufacturer, end-user and automation levels. Under the scope of this paper, we reviewed 56 drone regulations published by different authorities, and performed (1) a gap analysis against the 57 SRs derived by STPA for the authority level, and (2) Intra-Class Correlations in order to examine the extent of their harmonization. The results suggest that the regulations studied satisfy 5.3% to 66.7% of the SRs, and they are moderately similar. The harmonization is even lower when considering the range of values of various SRs addressed by the authorities. The findings from the drones’ case show that regulators might not similarly and completely address hazards introduced by new technology; such a condition might affect safety and impede the distribution and use of products in the international market. A timely and harmonized standardization based on a systematic hazard analysis seems crucial for tackling the challenges stemmed from technological advancements, especially the ones available to the public.

Comparing the procurement and tendering process for electric buses in the Utrecht and Hamburg region

In Germany, public transport organizations are mainly owned by public authorities. Procurement in Hamburg involves the buses and infrastructure instead of transport services. The procurement process for buses and infrastructure is performed by the transport companies. Such processes must meet German and European public regulations. Therefore, public tender and procurement procedures for buying buses by German Public Transport Operators (PTOs) can be more complex and lengthier than procurement by private PTOs in other countries. As a result, the public transport companies are not primarily driven by profitability, but also by obligations towards the public and political aims. Obligations can comprise to provide affordable, environmentallyfriendly transport services for the citizens. In Hamburg, the public authority incorporates obligations (requirements) for the e-buses in their tendering documents. In Utrecht, as well as most of the rest of the Netherlands, public transport is carried out by private companies, under an operating contract (concession) with a public transport authority. In Utrecht, this authority is the province of Utrecht. The e-buses are the operators’ private property and they are obliged to account to the province of Utrecht for their implementation of public transport. When the province of Utrecht procures the operation of public transport services by means of a European tendering process, private transport companies can offer a bid for this tender. Both, the authority and operators, want to provide good public transport for their customers, but they both have different goals. The operators want to earn a reasonable profit margin on public transport, while the authority wants to fulfil certain public policy goals. The tendering process is where these two come together. It is a strong mechanism to get the best ‘value for money’ out of the market – for example, the most public transport, or the highest number of e-buses running in the area, within the available budget of the public transport authority.

Balancing between coordination, cooperation and competition?

In recent years, the subsidiarity principle has been underlined in Sport-for-All policies in countries such as Germany, Austria and Belgium. According to this organising principle, issues need to be handled by the lowest possible political and administrative level, and as close to the citizens as possible. The 2007 decree concerning Sport-for-All policies at the local level in Flanders (Belgium) clearly referred to this. It emphasised the decentralisation of the Sport for All policy, and highlighted the regulatory and coordinating role of local sports authorities. As a consequence, they may face conflicting roles of being coordinator, regulator and provider of mass sport at the local level. In this paper, a mixed-method approach is used to give a closer insight in the role perceptions of local sports authorities in Flanders, and their position towards private sport providers. The results show that local sports authorities consider the coordination and regulation of mass sport in their municipality as their primary task. Yet, it appears that private sport providers also perceive competition from local sports authorities. Moreover, a considerable number of the local sports authorities believe they can combine the roles of provider and coordinator. As there appears to be considerable goal ambiguity, it is necessary for local sports authorities to formulate clear goals. Referring to the principle of subsidiarity, it is argued that sports authorities should only intervene when (non-)profit sport providers are not able to achieve the desirable outcomes with regard to sport and the welfare agenda.

Is government a right supervisor of the regulatory enforcement?

ABSTRACT. It is now generally accepted that the quality of the regulatory arrangements should be appraised not only by looking at the institutional design, but also by evaluating the factual enforcement and implementation of regulations. It is therefore advised that national governments take a more active stance in supervising the regulatory enforcement by different regulatory agencies. However, in some cases, government’s activism might be an impeding factor in regulatory enforcement. That this is not so crazy idea shows the analysis of the regulatory enforcement by Lithuanian Competition Authority in the area of competition policy during the years of integration to the European Union. For example, not only political and financial independence of the Competition Authority was difficult to establish, but also functions and competences of the regulatory agency were changed a number of times, which hampered the effectiveness of the agency’s performance while enforcing the competition law. In addition to often changes of functions, also the scope of competences was changing. As a result, the variety of tasks attributed to the Lithuanian Competition Authority caused the growing overload of work, which further hindered its regulatory practice. The question is who can be blamed for that? Was it just the inexperience of the government who was seeking for the best institutional design and could not stop with redesigning the regulatory agency or was it the intentional behaviour guided by some concrete interests as a result of a regulatory capture? The analysis of the regulatory enforcement during the period of 15 years does not allow for disregarding of the second possibility.

Leveraging data protection law for protecting workers’ fundamental right to health and safety in the workplace

The American company Amazon has made headlines several times for monitoring its workers in warehouses across Europe and beyond.1 What is new is that a national data protection authority has recently issued a substantial fine of €32 million to the e-commerce giant for breaching several provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation (gdpr) with its surveillance practices. On 27 December 2023, the Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (cnil)—the French Data Protection Authority—determined that Amazon France Logistique infringed on, among others, Articles 6(1)(f) (principle of lawfulness) and 5(1)(c) (data minimization) gdpr by processing some of workers’ data collected by handheld scanner in the distribution centers of Lauwin-Planque and Montélimar.2 Scanners enable employees to perform direct tasks such as picking and scanning items while continuously collecting data on quality of work, productivity, and periods of inactivity.3 According to the company, this data processing is necessary for various purposes, including quality and safety in warehouse management, employee coaching and performance evaluation, and work planning.4 The cnil’s decision centers on data protection law, but its implications reach far beyond into workers’ fundamental right to health and safety at work. As noted in legal literature and policy documents, digital surveillance practices can have a significant impact on workers’ mental health and overall well-being.5 This commentary examines the cnil’s decision through the lens of European occupational health and safety (EU ohs). Its scope is limited to how the French authority has interpreted the data protection principle of lawfulness taking into account the impact of some of Amazon’s monitoring practices on workers’ fundamental right to health and safety.