Building resilience to radicalization has become a key pillar of many policies for preventing violent extremism. However, sustained debates over the precise nature of the terms radicalisation and resilience impact the ability to implement these policies. A growing body of literature argues that the way in which key ideas are understood matters to what happens in practice. Additionally, the cross-sector collaboration called for in PVE policy can be made more challenging through divergences in understanding of central concepts. As such, the way in which resilience to radicalization is being understood by frontline workers matters. In light of this, a q-methodology study was conducted, which identified four perspectives on resilience to radicalization amongst policy-makers and practitioners in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK. These perspectives are examined in light of the broader debates around both resilience and radicalization, and the extent to which the divergences matter for collaboration is considered.
In recent years, the fight against terrorism and political violence has focused more on anticipating the threats that they pose. Therefore, early detection of ideas by local professionals has become an important part of the preventive approach in countering radicalization. Frontline workers who operate in the arteries of society are encouraged to identify processes toward violent behavior at an early stage. To date, however, little is known about how these professionals take on this screening task at their own discretion. Research from the Netherlands suggests that subjective assessment appears to exist. In this article, we argue that the absence of a clear norm for preliminary judgments affects prejudice or administrative arbitrariness, which may cause side effects due to unjustified profiling.
Despite the widely held notion that processes of radicalization tend to happen in relation to others, systematic evidence on the social context in which actors meet and form ties is scarce. This is problematic, as without a more thorough understanding of the relational dimension of radicalization, any strategy to intervene may turn out less effective than perhaps hoped for. Based on our access to detailed police information on eleven Dutch Salafi-Jihadi networks (2001–2014; 273 actors), this article presents a descriptive analysis of the social context in which actors meet and form ties. In most networks, we observe pre-existing family and friendship ties, actors to frequent Salafi mosques and radicalizing settings, and committed actors engaged in functional roles. We also find indications for these elements to facilitate actors to form ties. It is important to note however that we also observe exceptions, both in terms of prevalence and impact of the relational factors we study. In the article, we describe our detailed empirical findings and reflect on the (differential) social context is which actors participating in Dutch Salafi-Jihadi networks meet and form ties.
