Dienst van SURF
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This paper describes the work done to track the supply chains of sur-veillance technologies from the global North to African governments for illegal surveillance of their citizens. We conducted desk research to analyse the supply side of surveillance technology exported to African countries. Our preliminary findings show nine key exporting states-actors for surveillance technologies to Africa. These are China; European Union agencies, and member states France, Germany, Italy; Israel, United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States of Amer-ica. Regarding the specific surveillance technologies being transferred, each export-ing state tends to have a focus area, both in geographic area and within the five surveillance technology categories covered by this study. The paper identified six motives for state surveillance, including the suppliers' perspective. These are: 1) surveillance as legitimacy for state security, 2) surveillance for political gain, 3) surveillance as diplomacy, 4) surveillance as a tool for development, 5) Surveil-lance as neocolonialism, and 6) surveillance as business opportunity. Further re-search is needed to deepen the analysis of surveillance technologies exports to the African continent and the human rights violations.
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Vast empirical evidence underscores that exporting firms are more productive than non-exporters. As governments accordingly pursue export-promoting policies we are interested in the firmness of these conclusions with respect to African small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and the influence of the destination of export trade. Using a micro-panel dataset from five African countries we confirm the self-selection. We apply propensity scores to match exporters and use a difference-in-difference methodology to test if African SMEs experience productivity gains because of export participation. Results indicate that African firms significantly learn-by-exporting. Manufacturers obtain significant performance improvements due to internationalization although this effect is moderated by export destination. Firms that export outside Africa become more capital intensive and at the same time hire more workers. In contrast we find evidence that exporters within the African region significantly downsize in capital intensity. Results regarding skill-bias of internationally active firms are mixed, where exporters within the region expand in size and hire more relatively unskilled workers.
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