The ambition to host mega sports events is (or can be) perfectly justifiable with various arguments. The most persistently used argument is the supposed financial or direct economic gain for the host economy, of which the compelling body of evidence is discouraging. This implies that the justification for hosting should come from a different, broader economic angle. This paper provides a critical discussion of the myriad of economic and frequently intangible effects that could be put forward in the public debate preceding the submission of a bid. Paradoxically, most of these effects are not, or infrequently employed in public debates.
The increasingly multifaceted nature of event impacts makes them even more attractive as a potential solution to a range of urban and regional problems. As a result, competition to stage major cultural and sporting events is intensifying, and the cost of bidding is also rising. Given that such bidding processes only produce one winner, this means that a growing number of disappointed cities have to justify the costs of bidding for major events. In this context, we analyse the bidding process for the European Capital of Culture in the Netherlands (2018) and its impacts on local social structures. In particular the article focuses on the less tangible, non-economic effects of bidding for events, establishing a framework based on network formation, public support for the bidding process and social cohesion. The conclusions point to the key role of sociality and networking for events, which should therefore be developed throughout the bidding process for successful impacts, whether the event is won or not.
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Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has been recognized as an important technology to increase the local self-consumption of photovoltaics in the local energy system. Different auction mechanisms and bidding strategies haven been investigated in previous studies. However, there has been no comparatively analysis on how different market structures influence the local energy system’s overall performance. This paper presents and compares two market structures, namely a centralized market and a decentralized market. Two pricing mechanisms in the centralized market and two bidding strategies in the decentralized market are developed. The results show that the centralized market leads to higher overall system self-consumption and profits. In the decentralized market, some electricity is directly sold to the grid due to unmatchable bids and asks. Bidding strategies based on the learning algorithm can achieve better performance compared to the random method.
