The operations of take-off and landing at hub airports are often subject to a wide variety of delays; the effects of these delays impact not only the related stakeholders, such as aircraft operators, air-traffic control unity and ground handlers but as part of the European network, delays are propagated through the network. As a result, Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM) is being employed as a methodology for increasing the efficiency of Air Traffic Management (ATM), through the involvement of partners within the airports. Under CDM, there are some strategic common objectives regardless the airport or the partner specific interest to improve operational efficiency, predictability and punctuality to the ATM network and airport stakeholders. Monitoring and controlling some strategic areas such as, Efficiency, Capacity, Safety and Environment is needed to achieve the benefits. Therefore, the present work aims to provide a framework to monitor the accuracy of capacity in the three main flight phases. It aims to provide a comprehensible and practical approach to monitoring capacity by identifying and proposing Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) based on the A-CDM Milestone Approach to optimise the use of available capacity. To illustrate our approach, Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is used as case study as a full A-CDM airport.
Dit eindrapport behandelt het onderzoek van CDM@Airports, gericht op Collaborative Decision Making in de logistieke processen van luchtvrachtafhandeling op Nederlandse luchthavens. Dit project, met een looptijd van ruim twee jaar, is gestart op 8 november 2021 en geëindigd op 31 december 2023. HET PROJECT CDM@AIRPORTS OMVAT DRIE WERKPAKKETTEN: 1. Projectmanagement, dit betreft de algehele aansturing van het project incl. stuurgroep, werkgroep en stakeholdermanagement. 2. Onderzoeksactiviteiten, bestaande uit a) cross-chain-samenwerking, b) duurzaamheid en c) adoptie van digitale oplossingen voor datagedreven logistiek. 3. Management van een living lab, een ‘quadruple-helix-setting’ die fysieke en digitale leeromgevingen integreert voor onderwijs en multidisciplinair toegepast onderzoek.
MULTIFILE
In case of a major cyber incident, organizations usually rely on external providers of Cyber Incident Response (CIR) services. CIR consultants operate in a dynamic and constantly changing environment in which they must actively engage in information management and problem solving while adapting to complex circumstances. In this challenging environment CIR consultants need to make critical decisions about what to advise clients that are impacted by a major cyber incident. Despite its relevance, CIR decision making is an understudied topic. The objective of this preliminary investigation is therefore to understand what decision-making strategies experienced CIR consultants use during challenging incidents and to offer suggestions for training and decision-aiding. A general understanding of operational decision making under pressure, uncertainty, and high stakes was established by reviewing the body of knowledge known as Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). The general conclusion of NDM research is that experts usually make adequate decisions based on (fast) recognition of the situation and applying the most obvious (default) response pattern that has worked in similar situations in the past. In exceptional situations, however, this way of recognition-primed decision-making results in suboptimal decisions as experts are likely to miss conflicting cues once the situation is quickly recognized under pressure. Understanding the default response pattern and the rare occasions in which this response pattern could be ineffective is therefore key for improving and aiding cyber incident response decision making. Therefore, we interviewed six experienced CIR consultants and used the critical decision method (CDM) to learn how they made decisions under challenging conditions. The main conclusion is that the default response pattern for CIR consultants during cyber breaches is to reduce uncertainty as much as possible by gathering and investigating data and thus delay decision making about eradication until the investigation is completed. According to the respondents, this strategy usually works well and provides the most assurance that the threat actor can be completely removed from the network. However, the majority of respondents could recall at least one case in which this strategy (in hindsight) resulted in unnecessary theft of data or damage. Interestingly, this finding is strikingly different from other operational decision-making domains such as the military, police and fire service in which there is a general tendency to act rapidly instead of searching for more information. The main advice is that training and decision aiding of (novice) cyber incident responders should be aimed at the following: (a) make cyber incident responders aware of how recognition-primed decision making works; (b) discuss the default response strategy that typically works well in several scenarios; (c) explain the exception and how the exception can be recognized; (d) provide alternative response strategies that work better in exceptional situations.
